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1.  Introduction 
 
Immigration regularly causes debate in receiving countries about the potentially negative consequences 
an influx of immigrants may have on the welfare of incumbent residents. Of particular concern is 
whether immigrants “pay their way” in the welfare system. The belief that immigrants “take out” more 
than they “put in” is reflected in responses to questions in attitude surveys:  according to the 2002 
European Social Survey1 57% of the UK population believed that immigrants are taking more out than 
they put in the welfare system while only 11% thought that immigrants are net contributors.  
These fears were echoed in the debate following the European Union (EU) enlargement of May 1st 2004 
when the Central European countries Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, and Poland joined the European Union. Citizens of these countries were granted immediate 
right of free movement across all EU countries, though access to national labour markets could be 
restricted by national governments for a transition period of up to 7 years. Only the UK, Sweden and 
Ireland allowed immediate access of new Central European citizens to their labour markets.2  
Despite negative media coverage, there is no evidence that this expansion led, on average, to a setback 
of wages of workers born in the UK (see e.g. Dustmann, Frattini, & Preston (2008) and Lemos & Portes 
(2008)).   Concerns about the fiscal impact on the UK budget are also often expressed in the popular 
press: “[Eastern European] Economic migrants need schools for their children. They need housing. They 
need medical care. They can even lose their jobs.” (Daily Mirror, 24/7/2006)3, or “Jobs dry up but Poles 
stay to reap the benefits”4 (Daily Mail, 9/1/2009). In a recent interview with The Times the Immigration 
Minister Phil Woolas acknowledged that fears of immigrants exploiting the British social security system 
may give rise to anti-immigration sentiments - “The problem, according to the minister, is that ‘the 
perception that immigrants jump the housing queue is very strong, even though the reality is very 
different. We must cut back on the few cases of abuse so people see that the system is fair.’ – and 
suggested that some restrictions to welfare access may be needed -   “He is appalled by stories of 
immigrants being given £1 million houses at taxpayers' expense. ’These are council decisions. They 
shouldn't do that kind of thing. I just think it's wrong, even if it is rare.’”5(The Times, 18/10/2008).  
Are these concerns justified? Do A8 immigrants make a positive contribution to the UK fiscal system, or 
do they receive more payments than they contribute in terms of taxes and contributions? Are they 
more, or less likely than natives to claim welfare benefits and live in social housing?  This paper will 
                                                          
1
 This is the only wave of the European Social Survey where such question was asked. 
2
 As of June 2009, restrictions to the free movement of A8 labour were still in place in Austria and Germany only. 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain lifted all restrictions in 2006, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in 2007, 
France in 2008, Belgium and Denmark in 2009. 
3
 http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/columnists/parsons/2006/07/24/honesty-s-the-best-immigration-policy-115875-
17435755/ 
4
 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1108806/Jobs-dry-Poles-stay-reap-benefits.html  
5
 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4965568.ece  
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provide answers to these questions; we first analyse the welfare dependency of A8 immigrants and 
natives, addressing the question “Are A8 immigrants more or less likely to receive benefits or live in 
social housing than natives?” We then evaluate the fiscal impact of A8 immigration to the UK for the 
fiscal years 2005-06, 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09, by comparing the benefits of migration due to receipt 
of additional tax contributions, to the cost of migration due to provision of government services to these 
immigrants and their families. Our results suggest that A8 immigrants are far less likely to receive 
benefits or live in social housing than natives; furthermore, they contribute significantly more to the tax 
and benefit system than they receive. This may be because A8 immigrants are younger, better educated, 
and have fewer children than natives. However, our analysis shows that, even if these individuals were 
identical to British native born in all these characteristics, welfare and social housing receipts of the new 
A8 immigrants are still lower. 
In section 2 we provide some background information, summarising the previous literature on A8 
immigration against the institutional setting and then describing the data used in the paper.  Section 3 
outlines a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of the A8 population. In section 4 we present our 
regression analysis of the relative probability of A8 immigrants and natives being on welfare or in social 
housing, and we describe our assessment of the A8's net fiscal impact. We discuss our results and 
outline the likely dynamic evolution in section 5. 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Previous literature 
 
The stock of literature studying the fiscal impact of immigration is surprisingly small when compared, for 
instance, to the number of papers that attempt to estimate the labour market effects of immigration6.  
A number of papers have investigated whether immigrants are more or less likely than natives to use 
the provision of the welfare state (see e.g. Borjas & Hilton (1996), Brucker, Epstein, Saint-Paul, Venturini, 
& Zimmerman (2002), Barrett & McCarthy (2007)) and/or whether immigrants assimilate into or out of 
the welfare state (e.g. Borjas & Trejo (1991), Hansen & Lofstrom (2003))7. These studies typically use 
one or more cross sections or panel data to study the differential use of some welfare programs 
                                                          
6
 Some of the most recent assessments of the wage effects of immigration in the UK are Manacorda, Manning, & 
Wadsworth (2006), Dustmann, Frattini, & Preston (2008), Nickell & Saleheen (2008)). Lemos & Portes (2008) study 
the labour market impact of A8 immigration to the UK, and do not detect any effect for natives’ wages or 
unemployment. Blanchflower & Shadforth (2009) in their analysis of the consequences of migration from Eastern 
Europe on the UK economy suggest that immigration may have slowed wage inflation through the “fear of 
unemployment” mechanism. 
7
 Barrett & McCarthy (2008) present a recent review of this literature. 
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between immigrants and natives or between different cohorts of immigrants, or for the same immigrant 
cohorts over time.  
Analyses of this type allow controlling for many individual characteristics and give important insights 
into how immigration interacts with the welfare state, but are clearly uninformative about the net fiscal 
effects of immigration. This is because they typically do not consider all types of government transfers, 
focussing on some type of welfare benefits only; also, they do not consider the amount of taxes paid in 
by immigrants.  
Another group of studies has instead focused on the net fiscal impact of immigration (see Rowthorn 
(2008) for a recent review).  Papers assessing the overall fiscal impact of immigration by comparing the 
difference between benefits received and taxes paid by immigrant can be classified as either static or 
dynamic analyses. For any given year, static analyses calculate the annual net fiscal contribution of 
immigrants as the difference between the value of taxes paid and the value of government transfers 
received8. Meanwhile dynamic studies instead compute the net present value of the lifetime net fiscal 
contribution of immigrants, and (in some cases) that of their descendants.  
The main strength of the static approach is its simplicity and straightforwardness; no strong assumptions 
are required about the future behaviour of immigrants or the evolution of fiscal policies. Static analysis 
addresses the question “What is the net contribution of a particular group of immigrants to the tax and 
welfare system?”. Static analysis is backward looking, it allows assessment of how particular cohorts of 
immigrants have contributed to the tax- and welfare system over a period for which data is available. 
This type of analysis provides answers to questions usually raised in the public debate; for instance, in 
the case of A8 immigration to the UK, this approach can be used to assess the net contribution of A8 
immigrants to the UK since EU enlargement.  
Static analysis does not provide a projection into the future. For example it does not address the 
question “What is the discounted net contribution of a particular group of immigrants over their life 
cycle to the tax and benefit system of the host country?” Dynamic models allow for such assessment 
(see e.g. Storesletten (2000)) but require strong modelling assumptions regarding immigrant fertility, 
propensity to return to the country of origin, labour market participation, and future government 
spending and tax policies. These assumptions can substantially influence the final result, and may lead 
to predictions being unreliable. This is particularly the case for A8 immigrants as their very recent 
migration history allows only for limited data-based predictions regarding the evolution of their 
behaviour over time spent in the UK, or on their return migration patterns.  
The analysis provided in this paper does not attempt to predict the future fiscal impact of the existing A8 
immigrant population. It instead evaluates the annual net fiscal effect immigrants from A8 countries had 
on the UK since enlargement in 2004. We also assess the degree to which A8 immigrants obtain 
                                                          
8
 Card (2007) - following the suggestion in Edmonston & Lee (1996) – performs a different type of static analysis 
comparing measures of local spending and local tax revenues across cities with different immigrant concentration. 
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benefits, or rely on social housing, in comparison to UK native born.  Previous work has considered the 
fiscal impact of overall migration (see Gott & Johnston (2002) and an extension until 2003/2004 by 
Sriskandarajah, Cooley, & Reed (2005)); ours is the first study to assess the fiscal impact of A8 
immigration to the UK9 
 
2.2 The 2004 EU enlargement and immigration to the UK 
 
On May 1st 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Poland, became members of the European Union. The EC Treaty guarantees free 
movement for all EU citizens, meaning every EU national has the right of employment in any EU member 
state on the same basis as a national of that country. However, the 2003 Treaty of Accession allowed 
member states to opt for restricting the access of nationals of new member states to their labour 
market (but not their movement) for a transitory period of up to a maximum of seven years. Fears that 
an inflow of immigrants from the new member countries could compromise natives’ labour market 
opportunities led most EU-15 states to impose some restrictions to the employment of nationals of the 
new member states, with the exception of citizens of Cyprus and Malta. The nationals of the remaining 
eight Central and Eastern European accession countries came to be collectively known as the A8. The 
UK, the Irish Republic, and Sweden were the only EU member states that allowed A8 citizens 
unrestricted access to their labour markets. However, due to public concern that mass immigration from 
A8 countries would impact on the UK labour market and impose a burden on the welfare state, the UK 
introduced the so-called “Worker Registration Scheme” (WRS) to monitor the inflow of A8 workers. All 
A8 immigrants who intend to work for at least one month in the UK are required to register with the 
WRS, and pay the corresponding registration fee (currently £90). A8 immigrants are also limited in 
accessing the UK social security system; they are not eligible for tax credits until they register with the 
WRS, while eligibility for income-related benefits (Income Support, Pension Credit, Jobseeker’s 
Allowance, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit) comes only after twelve months of continuous 
employment. After this period immigrants are no longer required to register with the WRS and can 
obtain a residence permit confirming their right to live and work in the UK. 
Following EU enlargement, the UK witnessed a rapid rise in the resident population of A8 migrants. 
Figure 1 depicts data from the Labour Force Survey. Between the second quarter 2004 and the first 
quarter 2009, the share of immigrants from A8 countries as a proportion of the UK population increased 
from 0.01% to 0.9% (solid line), comprising 1.3% of the working age population by the beginning of 2009 
(dotted line). During the same period, the share of foreign born individuals increased from 8.7% to 
                                                          
9
 See Lemos & Portes (2008) and Blanchflower & Lawton (2009) for an assessment of the labour market 
consequences of A8 migration. 
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11.3% of the total population, meaning that over one third of the total increase in the foreign 
population in recent years is due to migration from A8 countries10. 
3. Data and Descriptives 
 
The main source of data used in this study is the Labour Force Survey; we also draw on a number of 
publications by HM Treasury, the Office for National Statistics, and several other Government 
Departments.  Below, we briefly describe each of these data sources and also provide some descriptive 
statistics. 
3.1 The Labour Force Survey 
 
The British Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a quarterly representative survey of all households residing at 
private addresses in the UK. Every quarter approximately 53,000 households are surveyed, representing 
about 0.1% of the total UK population. The LFS is a rotating panel whereby every household is 
interviewed for five successive cohorts before exiting the sample. The survey excludes individuals who 
have been resident in their household for less than 6 months and those who live in communal 
establishments; the LFS is therefore likely to underestimate the UK population of recent immigrants.  
The LFS provides weights to compensate for differential non-response among different groups of the 
population.  However as these weights are constructed without taking nationality or country of birth 
into account, they may be slightly inaccurate for determining the overall size of the foreign born 
population.  Despite these limitations, the LFS remains the best available source of data on immigrant 
stocks, and is used for this purpose as well as when determining the labour market status or 
determining a number of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the A8 and native 
population. We also use the LFS for our regression analysis of A8 residual welfare dependency. 
As the fiscal year in the UK lasts from April to March, we use the LFS to apportion  government 
expenditures and receipts for the years 2005-06 to 2008-09, by pooling the four relevant quarters of 
each year (for instance, for fiscal year 2008-09 we pool  LFS Q2-Q3-Q4 2008 and LFS Q1 2009).  
Government expenditures and receipts 
We use tax receipt data from the Budget Reports for 2007-2009 (Chapter C, Table C6 years 2009 and 
2008, Table C8 year 2007), as published by HM Treasury. Expenditure data are taken from the Public 
                                                          
10
 See Drinkwater, Eade, & Garapich (2006), Blanchflower & Lawton (2009) and Blanchflower & Shadforth (2009) 
for more descriptive information on A8 immigrants and their labour market outcomes. 
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Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2009 (PESA) (Table 5.2 “Total Expenditure on Services by sub-function, 
2003-04 to 2008-09”) also published by HM Treasury.11 
Other data sources 
We also use data from the 2005, 2006 and 2007 Offender Management Caseload Statistics (OMCS) and 
from the June 2008 Population in Custody statistics (PiC), both Ministry of Justice Statistics Bulletin. We 
use these data to compute the nationality of the population in prison and to apportion costs of 
administering the legal system (law courts and prisons).  
Information on distribution of health costs by age group is taken from the 2006 Department for Health 
Departmental Report (Figure 6.2: Hospital and Community Health Services Gross Current Expenditure by 
Age, 2003-04).  
We use the annual ONS publication “The effects of taxes and benefits on household income” (ETB) for 
years 2005-06 and 2006-07 (the latest available year) to compute effective tax rates for VAT and other 
consumption taxes by decile of household disposable income. The ETB uses data from the Expenditure 
and Food Survey to analyse how taxes and benefits redistribute income between households in the UK, 
and provides detailed information on both gross and net income, cash and in-kind transfers as well as on 
taxes (including indirect taxes) paid according to the position of the household in the income 
distribution. 
The ONS 2006 “Share Ownership” report gives the results of a survey of the ownership of ordinary 
shares in quoted companies in the United Kingdom. The survey, conducted by the ONS, gives details on 
the beneficial ownership of UK listed companies and, importantly, includes a geographical breakdown of 
holdings outlining foreign ownership between 1999 and 2006. We use this information in the 
apportionment of corporation taxes.  
3.2 Immigration from the A8 countries 
 
We define an A8 immigrant as a national of an A8 country who arrived in the UK in 2004 or later12. In 
Table 1, we report descriptive statistics for A8 immigrants, pooling all quarterly waves from the second 
quarter 2004 to the first quarter 2009. The figures suggest that A8 immigrants are substantially younger 
and better educated than the native population; male A8 immigrants are on average almost 12 years 
younger than native born men (26 vs. 38), while women are 15 years younger than their native born 
counterparts (25 vs. 40). Moreover 70% of A8 men and 67% of A8 women are between the age of 20 
and 35, while only 19% of native men and 18% of native women fall within the same age bracket.  
                                                          
11
 Data for fiscal years 2004-05 to 2007-08 are based on outturn receipts and expenditures, whereas data for 2008-
09 are estimates based on figures for the first two quarters only, giving a larger margin for error in the analysis for 
2008-09. 
12
 The LFS does not allow identifying the month of arrival, so we cannot separately identify immigrants arrived 
before and after May 2004. 
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We measure education as the age at which individuals left full time education. An alternative measure is 
provided in the LFS and permits classification according to the UK education system, however due to the 
difficulties in reconciling international education systems we do not use this measure13. Instead we 
assign to the category “low education” all individuals who left full time education at 16 or earlier, the 
category “intermediate education” to all individuals who left full time education between the age of 17 
and 20, and finally “high education” to all individuals who left full time education aged 21 or over. 
According to this classification, 32% of A8 men and 40% of A8 women are highly educated, while only 
18% of native men and 16% of native women fall in this category. Conversely, the share of A8 migrants 
with a low education is around five times smaller than that of natives.  
A8 immigrants have a higher labour market attachment than natives with a labour market participation 
rate14 of 95% for men (83% among natives) and 80% for women (75% among natives). A8 immigrants, 
particularly men, also have higher employment rates15: 90% of men and 74% of women at working age 
have a job (where working age is defined as 16-65 for men and 16-60 for women). This compares to 78% 
and 71% among native men and women respectively.  
Despite the higher level of education among A8 immigrants, their average hourly wages are 
considerably lower than those of natives. This disadvantage is present at all parts of the wage 
distribution; Table 1 suggests that A8 immigrants’ median wages, along with wages measured at the 10th 
and 90th percentiles of the wage distribution are substantially lower than those of natives for both males 
and females (wages are real wages in 2005-equivalent pounds).  While the average (median) hourly 
wage for A8 immigrant men is £6.8(£6.1), it is £11.9(£9.8) for native born men, and the native-A8 gap is 
larger at the top than at the bottom of the wage distribution.  
The statistics in Table 1 are based on information obtained from pooling LFS quarters from the second 
quarter 2004 to the first quarter 2009, across different immigrant arrival cohorts. How do wages of the 
new immigrants develop with time spent in the UK? Although we do not have longitudinal data, it is 
possible to follow the same arrival cohort of A8 immigrants in the LFS to investigate changes in 
outcomes for the same arrival cohort over time; we present results in Table 2. The first panel refers to 
average wages. The numbers show a remarkable increase in average wages, for example, for the cohort 
that arrived in 2004/2005,  wages have increased by 40 percent after four years in the UK. Wage growth 
for later cohorts follows a similar pattern, as can be seen from the other rows of the top panel.  Mean 
wage growth across all arrival cohorts has averaged around 5 percent per year. This is very substantial, 
especially considering that the real wage growth of natives over the same period, reported in the last 
row of the panel, stands at just over 1 percent per year .  
                                                          
13
 The LFS variable “hiqual” classifies all foreign degrees as “Other qualification”. See the appendix of Manacorda, 
Manning, & Wadsworth (2006) for a discussion. 
14
 Labour market participation rate: ratio of individuals who are either  employed, self-employed or looking for a 
job to the total working age population. 
15
 Employment rate: ratio of employed or self-employed individuals to total working age population. 
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The increase in wages of A8 immigrants is slightly higher at the 10th than at the 90th percentile of the 
distribution; for the 2004 arrival cohort, the respective numbers are 45% and 36% until 2008/2009. 
Again, wage growth of native born workers over the same period has been much lower, as indicated by 
the numbers in the last rows of the respective panels.  
The last two panels of Table 2 report employment rates and participation rates, again following the 
same arrival cohort. For the cohort that arrived in 2004, the employment rate grew by 13 percentage 
points (or 18%) over the next four years, and was more than 10 percentage points higher than that of 
native born workers by 2008/09. The participation rate likewise slightly increased, and is higher than 
that of native born workers even just after arrival (with the exception of the last cohort that arrived in 
2008).  
These numbers suggest that A8 immigrants are much more educated than native born workers. Despite 
this, they receive far lower wages on average. Yet their wage growth in the first four years of arrival is 
remarkable, and far higher than that of native born workers. They have also very high employment and 
participation rates, with employment rates increasing even further during the first years after arrival.  
The figures presented in these tables do not account for differences in education or labour market 
experience between the two groups. A8 immigrants are younger than British born workers (see Table 1), 
which may partly explain their lower wages as well as their steeper wage growth profiles. However, the 
figures in the tables suggest that A8 immigrants – after initial disadvantage – have a period of rapid 
wage growth, which may be explained by transferring home country specific human capital to the needs 
of the UK labour market, and by obtaining information about better and more suitable job 
opportunities.  
As the LFS does not allow us to follow the same individuals over time, selective out-migration may lead 
to these numbers being an over- or under-estimate of wage and employment growth profiles from an 
individual’s perspective. However, from a welfare point of view, the numbers in Table 2 are the most 
relevant as they measure the contribution of those immigrants that reside in the UK.  
4. Analysis 
 
4.1 Welfare dependency 
 
We now turn to the question whether A8 immigrants are more or less likely than natives to receive 
public transfers. We investigate receipt of state benefits or tax credits, and the likelihood of residence in 
10 
 
 
social housing16. Since A8’s eligibility for many benefits is limited for the first year in the UK (see section 
2), we restrict our analysis to those immigrants who have been in the UK for more than one year. 
Table 3 reports regression results from the following model: 
 
Where i  is an index for individuals, y is alternatively a dummy variable indicating whether the individual 
receives any state benefits or tax credits (columns 1-3) or indicating whether the individual is living in 
social housing (columns 4-6), A8 identifies A8 immigrants who have been in the UK for at least one year, 
O are immigrants from other countries, or immigrants from an A8 country arrived before 2004, τt are 
time effects (year-quarter interaction) and X is a vector of other control variables which includes gender, 
education, age, and the number of dependent children in the household17. The error term  is allowed 
to be correlated over time for the same individual, but not across individuals; we account for this by 
clustering the standard errors at the individual level. The coefficient β can therefore be interpreted as 
the difference in the probability of receiving state benefits between eligible A8 immigrants and natives, 
conditional on variables included in the vector X. 
Column 1 in Table 3 reports the results from a regression which includes only year and quarter variables 
as control variables. The reported parameter is the raw difference in the probability of claiming state 
benefits of tax credits between A8 immigrants and natives. The figures show that A8 immigrants have a 
probability of receiving benefits which is 23.2 percentage points lower than for natives. Since the 
average probability of receiving benefits or tax credits is 39.2% (see also Table 1), this means that A8 
immigrants have a 60% lower probability of being on welfare. Thus, if we compare the A8 immigrant 
population in the UK over the period between 2005 and 2009, the probability that A8 immigrants claim 
state benefits or tax credits is substantially smaller than that of natives. 
One reason for the lower probability of receipt might be that A8 immigrants are very different in their 
demographic characteristics to the native born. In columns 2 and 3, we gradually make A8 immigrants 
more “similar” to natives, by adding additional control variables. This leads to a reduction in the size of 
the estimated coefficient. In the specification with full controls the coefficient drops to -0.053. This 
implies that  if A8 immigrant were identical to natives in their educational background, their age and 
gender structure and the number of dependent children, they would still be 5 percentage points (or 
13.5%) less likely than natives to claim state benefits or tax credits18. 
                                                          
16
 Unfortunately we have no information about the amount of the benefit received, nor on the length of the 
welfare spell.  
17
 Specifically, we include age and age squared, dummy variables for low and intermediate education defined as 
above (high education is the excluded category), employment status, current disability, no dependent children 
under 19 in the household, and the number of dependent children under 19 in the household.  
18
 Notice that the sample size shrinks as we include additional regressors. As a robustness check, we estimate the 
unconditional coefficient for the same sample that we use in the regression results reported in column (3). The 
estimated coefficient is -0.213, which is smaller than the estimate of -0.232 reported in the table. This suggests 
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We have replicated this analysis to estimate the probability of A8 immigrants living in social housing. 
Results are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 3. Column 4 shows that the unconditional probability of an 
A8 immigrant with at least one year of residence in the UK of being in social housing is ten percentage 
points lower than for natives. Over the period 2004-2009 17.3% of the UK population was residing in 
social housing (see also Table 1), suggesting that A8 immigrants are 58% less likely than natives to live in 
social housing. As before, as we include more control variables the coefficient shrinks, but even if A8 
immigrants were identical to natives in individual characteristics and the number of dependent children 
they would still be five percentage points (or 28%) less likely than natives to live in social housing. 
 
4.2 Computing the Fiscal Impact of A8 Immigration 
 
We now turn to a detailed analysis of the net fiscal impact of A8 immigrants to the UK tax and benefit 
system. As discussed above, our approach compares the transfers made to native born workers and A8 
immigrants to the taxes and contributions the two groups make to the welfare system. Computation of 
these figures is based on various data sources, but requires some assumptions. We will compute various 
scenarios under different sets of assumptions. 
More formally, in every year t the government runs a surplus or deficit (GSUR), which is given by the 
difference between revenues (REV) and expenditures (EXP). In turn, total revenues are calculated as the 
sum of all different taxes levied by the government (revi, i=1,…,NR), where the total number of taxes is 
denoted by NR.  Further, total expenditures are the sum of NE different government expenditures (expj, 
j=1,…,NE). Therefore, the total government surplus or deficit can be written as: 
  (1) 
 
We can de-compose this number into net contributions of the different population groups in the UK at a 
particular point in time (where “other immigrants” are the residual group). For our purposes, we divide 
the total UK population in three groups: A8 immigrants, natives, and other immigrants. We can then re-
write equation (1) as: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
that the estimate in column (3) underestimates the difference in the claiming probability between the two groups 
due to sample attrition. 
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(2) 
 
where , G=A8, N, denotes the share of group G’s  payments of taxes i  and  denotes the share of 
group G’s  receipts of government expenditures j. 
One can further manipulate (2) to obtain: 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
where  and  denote the share of total revenues and of total 
expenditures, respectively, that can be assigned to group G. 
In the remainder of this section we compute these shares using data from government accounts and the 
LFS for the fiscal years 2005-06 to 2008-09. This enables assessment as to whether in each year, A8 
immigrants under- or over- contribute to total tax payments and to total government expenditure, by  
comparing  and , weighted with the share of A8 immigrants in total population, sA8.  It also allows 
us to investigate whether A8 immigrants are net fiscal contributors. If A8 immigrants contribute more 
(less) to the tax system than they take out in terms of benefit receipts, then the ratio  should be 
larger (smaller) than one. 
This computation depends critically on the criteria chosen to apportion revenues and expenditures, i.e. 
on the exact definition of the  and , which is not always straightforward and requires some 
assumptions. In the remainder of this section we explain and discuss the assumptions used. We 
compute a central scenario, which is considered to be the most reasonable in terms of the assumptions 
made. To check robustness, we will also compute a number of alternative scenarios. We provide exact 
details of the specification of each of these methods in the Appendix. 
Table 4 summarises the criteria used to apportion each category of government receipts in the central 
scenario (scenario 1) and under the two alternative scenarios . In the table we have aggregated the 32 
main components of public sector receipts from Table C6 of the 2009 Budget Report into nine groups. 
Full details on how each component has been grouped are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
We use LFS information on weekly wages (grsswk) to calculate the share of income taxes and national 
insurance contributions (NIC) paid by A8 and natives. For each individual with wage information in the 
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LFS we calculate the value of income taxes and national insurance contributions paid, applying actual 
income tax and NIC rates to their taxable income, which is calculated taking into account second jobs 
and contributions to private pensions (see Appendix for details). For each fiscal year, we can then 
calculate the amount of income taxes and NIC paid by A8 and natives, and estimate their share of total 
payments19.  
Since in all years Child Tax Credits constitute about 75% of total tax credits expenditures (source: HMRC 
-Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics: Finalised annual awards, 2007-08, Table 1.1), we apportion in 
our central scenario tax credits according to the proportion of dependent children of A8 or UK natives. 
Alternatively, in  our scenario 2, we calculate for every year the share of CTC in total tax credits20. We 
then use this share to calculate the amount of total tax credits to be allocated according to the 
proportion of dependent children and we allocate the remainder proportionately to the A8 and natives 
share of population.  
For determining allocation coefficients of consumption taxes (VAT and excise duties) we proceed in two 
steps.  Table 24 of the ONS publication “The effects of taxes and benefits on household income” reports 
average incomes and average tax payments for several indirect taxes by decile of household disposable 
income. We use this to construct decile-specific effective tax rates, and then apply these tax rates to 
individuals in the LFS, based on their households’ position in the wage distribution21. We then proceed 
as for income taxes, calculating for every year the amount of each indirect tax paid by A8 and natives, 
and their share in total payments.  
In the case of Vehicle Excise Duties (VED), which are levied on cars, we  also use (in scenario 2) LFS 
information on  whether individuals drive to work to proxy for car ownership.  In this case we apportion 
VED revenues proportionately to the share of each group in the population of individuals who drive to 
work. 
We apportion corporation taxes and capital gains taxes, taking into account the role of foreign 
shareholders (here we follow Sriskandarajah, Cooley, & Reed (2005)). In particular, we use the ONS 
“Share ownership” information to calculate the percentage of foreign shareholders in UK companies, 
and subtract from the total corporation tax revenue their share. We then allocate the remaining share 
proportionately to the population. This allocation implies that, on average, native born workers and A8 
                                                          
19
 The LFS does not have wage information for the self-employed. Therefore they are excluded from this 
calculation. Taxes on incomes of the self-employed make up less than 15% of total income tax revenues in every 
year (source: HMRC Survey of Personal Incomes, table 3-4). Therefore as a robustness check we have calculated in 
every year the share of total income tax payments due to employees. We have then used this share to calculate 
the fraction of total income tax payments to be apportioned as described above, and we have allocated the 
remainder proportionately to the share of A8 immigrants and UK natives in the self-employed population. Results 
are virtually unchanged. 
20
 72% in 2007-08, 73% in 2006-07, 75% in 2005-06.  
21
 For instance, in 2006-07 the average household income of the bottom decile was £2,262, and the average VAT 
payment of the same decile was £875, so that the effective VAT rate for an individual in the bottom decile of the 
distribution of household income was 38.7%. 
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immigrants own the same share of UK companies stocks, relative to their share in the population. This 
may be unlikely as A8 immigrants had less time to be engaged in entrepreneurial activities22. We 
therefore  consider an alternative scenario (scenario 3) where all corporation and capital gains taxes are 
allocated to natives. 
Since taxes on houses are the single largest share of inheritance tax receipts (about 40% of inheritance 
tax is levied against property, according to HMRC figures23) - and they are also likely to be a good proxy 
for other assets -  in our central scenario we use the proportion of A8 immigrants and natives in the total 
population of house-owners from the LFS to apportion its revenue. Although house-ownership is not 
very common among A8 immigrants (only 5% of A8 immigrants - and 74% of natives - own outright or 
are buying with a mortgage the house they live in), this allocation may still be over-estimating A8’s 
payments, as due to their age structure their mortality rates are low. Therefore we also consider an 
alternative scenario where all inheritance tax is apportioned to natives only (scenario 3).  
To allocate council tax payments we use the proportion of A8 immigrant and native households from 
the LFS. Alternatively, in our third scenario, we simply apportion council tax payments proportionately 
to population. Allocation of Business rate receipts is not straightforward. Business rates, a tax on non-
domestic property, is typically paid by businesses and other organisations that occupy non-domestic 
premises. In our central scenario we therefore use the proportion of A8 and natives in the self-employed 
population (from the LFS) to apportion revenue. In scenario 2, we alternatively apportion it proportional 
to population shares. 
All remaining tax payments are apportioned proportionately to the population. These are the three 
“environmental” taxes, contributing annually to less than 0.4% of total revenue,  “Other taxes and 
royalties”, “Adjustments”, “Interest and dividends”, “Other receipts”, and the negative item “Own 
resources contribution to EC budget” which do not have any other natural apportioning criterion. 
Table 5 summarises the criteria followed to apportion expenditures, i.e. to construct each , in the 
central scenario (scenario 1), and in two alternative scenarios.  In the table we have aggregated each 
element of Table 5.2 (“Public sector expenditure on services by sub-function”) in PESA 2009 into 11 
groups. Details on the grouping and a full list of expenditures are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
A critical issue here is how to allocate expenditures for public goods. Provision of purely public goods 
(e.g. national defence, environmental protection) is to a large extent independent of the number of 
immigrants, and this is particularly true in the case of a relatively small group like the A8. However, here 
we take a more conservative stance and price “pure” public goods at their average cost for both 
immigrants and natives in all scenarios. In other words, we allocate the costs for public goods 
proportionately to the share of A8 immigrants or natives in the population. Notice that this is likely to 
                                                          
22
 For instance, the LFS shows that the self-employment rate was 7.3% among employed A8 immigrants and 12.2% 
among natives.  
23
 Table 12.6, available at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/inheritance_tax/iht_126jan09.pdf  
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result in an underestimate of the A8's net fiscal contribution, and an overestimate of the net fiscal 
contribution of natives.  The alternative is to assume that the supply of “pure” public goods would be 
unchanged in the absence of A8 migrants, and therefore spread its cost among the resident population 
(natives and previous immigrants) only. This alternative computation would clearly imply an 
improvement in the net fiscal contribution of A8 migrants, and a worsening of the net fiscal contribution 
of natives. In the Appendix we recalculate all our scenarios adopting this alternative apportionment.  
Other publicly provided goods and services can, to different extents, suffer from congestion. For 
instance, the costs of waste management or the costs for fire protection services are both likely to 
increase with population increases. For this reason we apportion in all scenarios the expenditures for 
“Other public goods” proportionately to the share of A8 immigrants and natives in the total population.  
Expenditure on prisons is apportioned proportionately to the nationality of inmates, taken from the 
Ministry of Justice Statistics Bullettins “Offender Management Caseload Statistics” and the “Population 
in Custody statistics”. This certainly provides an over-estimate of the prison expenditure for A8 migrants 
as we have no information about the year of arrival of foreign prison inmates, and it is likely - especially 
in the first years after the enlargement – that nationals from an A8 country who are in prison have 
arrived before May 2004. As no information is available regarding the number of trials or litigations 
involving A8 immigrants, we use this same data to apportion expenditures for law courts, again a 
conservative allocation for post-2004 A8 immigrants. 
Housing development is apportioned proportionately to the share of the two populations living in social 
housing, which we calculate from the LFS. Coefficients for health care costs are calculated after taking 
into account the age structure of the population (again based on the LFS) and the share of gross current 
expenditures on the hospital and community health services for each age group in 2003-0424, as detailed 
in the Department for Health Departmental Report 200625.  
Since for all years family benefits, income support and tax credits make up between 84% and 90% of 
expenditures for “Social exclusion n.e.c.”, we apportion this proportionately to the share of each group 
in the population of income support or family benefits recipients, calculated from the LFS. 
We allocate expenditure on compulsory education to the two groups by using LFS information on the 
proportion of migrant/native children that belong to each sub-population for pre-primary, primary and 
                                                          
24
 These are the latest figures available, and we use them for constructing the coefficients in every year. We are 
therefore implicitly assuming that the health expenditure by age group did not vary over the years we consider. 
25
 Although age is the main factor in determining healthcare costs, socio-economic status is another important 
determinant of health determinants (see e.g. Smith (2007)). However we have no information on healthcare 
expenditure by socio-economic status and age group, so we use age structure only. A8 migrants earn significantly 
less than UK nationals in all age groups. On the one hand one may therefore suspect that they may have a poorer 
health status and therefore require a higher share of health expenditure.  On the other hand, though, the 
proportion of individuals reporting long term ill-health in the LFS is much lower for A8 migrants than for natives in 
every age group. 
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secondary education. Expenditure in post-secondary education is apportioned by using LFS self-reported 
information about the current qualification individuals are currently studying towards.  
Table 5.2 of PESA reports expenditures for two types of police services: “immigration and citizenship”, 
and “other police services”. In our central scenario we apportion both of these elements proportionately 
to the population shares.  However, one could argue that immigration controls costs should be charged 
to immigrants only26. We consider this possibility in scenario 3, where police services for immigration 
and citizenship are apportioned entirely to the foreign born population (i.e the natives’ share of this cost 
is zero, and the cost is borne only by A8 and other immigrants, proportionately according to their 
populations). Similarly, expenditure for police services may increase if the newcomers have a higher 
propensity for crime . We account for this possibility in scenario 3, where we use the share of migrants 
in the prison population as a proxy for crime activity in each group. 
The LFS contains several detailed questions about the type of social security benefits received (but does 
not detail the amount). It is therefore possible, in principle, to apportion each type of expenditure for 
social protection according to the proportion of individuals receiving the relevant benefit. However, due 
to the small sample size and problems of under-reporting of benefits receipts in the LFS, the direct 
measurement of recipients of each type of benefit by immigrant status is subject to a considerable 
measurement error. As there are no alternative data outlining benefit receipts by nationality or country 
of birth27, we use in our central estimate the potential rather than the self-declared recipients to 
apportion social protection expenditures. This is again conservative – it is likely to overestimate the 
share of benefits received by A8 immigrants both because of legal limits in eligibility (see section 2) and  
because immigrants are usually less likely to take up benefits they are eligible to, especially in the first 
few years after immigration (see e.g. Borjas & Trejo (1991) and Borjas & Hilton (1996)). Using self-
declared benefit receipts – as we do in scenario 2 – does not alter significantly the results (see Table 7). 
 
4.3 The Net Fiscal Impact of A8 Immigration 
 
Table 6 reports our results under the assumptions presented in Table 4 and Table 5 for the central 
scenario (scenario 1 in both tables), for fiscal years 2005-06 to 2008-09. 
For all fiscal years A8 immigrants’ contribution to total government revenues was similar to their share 
in the overall population. For example, in 2007-08, A8 immigrants constituted 0.87% of the total UK 
population, and accounted for 0.81% of total government revenues, while in 2008-09 they totalled 
                                                          
26
 See appendix and Sriskandarajah, Cooley, & Reed (2005) for a discussion. 
27
 The Home Office Accession Monitoring Report reports some information about number of accepted and 
rejected applications of A8 immigrants for a limited number of benefits. However since the DWP does not collect 
nationality data there is no way of calculating the number of successful (or unsuccessful) benefit applications for 
natives.  
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0.91% of the population, and accounted for 0.96% of total government revenues. This is because, 
despite receiving lower wages than natives, and hence paying on average lower income taxes, A8 
immigrants have very high employment rates. Largely due to this, overall the A8 immigrants’ share of 
total income tax revenues is not proportionately much lower than natives’.  Moreover, they also pay 
proportionately more than natives in indirect taxes, as the effective tax rate for most consumption taxes 
is higher for low-income individuals. In 2008-09, for instance,  A8s contributed 0.85% of total income tax 
revenues and  1.3% of total VAT revenues despite constituting 0.9% of the population.  Meanwhile 
natives contributed 86.4% of income tax and 87.3% of VAT revenues despite accounting for 88.8% of the 
population.  This gives a ratio of the share of income tax payments to share in the population of 0.94 for 
A8s and 0.98 for natives with respective figures of 1.4 and 0.98 for VAT. 
Moreover, in every year shown A8 immigrants accounted for a smaller share in government spending 
than their share of the population  (for example 0.6% in 2008-09, which is far below their share in the 
overall population of 0.91%). Therefore,  overall A8 immigrants made a net contribution to public 
finances. 
This is illustrated in the last two columns of Table 6, where we report the ratio of revenues to 
expenditures for both A8 immigrants and natives. In all years, the ratio of tax receipts to expenditures 
for A8 immigrants was well above 1, indicating that A8 immigrants paid substantially more in taxes than 
they received in government assistance. The figures in the Table suggest that the A8 contribution to 
taxes was over 35% higher than the amount received in direct or indirect government transfers. This is 
even more remarkable because over this period the government was running a budget deficit, which is 
partially reflected by the same ratio of receipts to expenditures for natives, which was below 1 in every 
year. 
We believe that the estimates we present in Table 7 are based on a set of plausible assumptions, which 
as discussed earlier, are rather conservative in the sense that they are likely to overestimate the 
expenditures allocated to A8 immigrants and underestimate the contributions made by the same group. 
However, as previously explained and as reported in Table 4 and Table 5 we also consider different 
allocation methods for both revenues and expenditures.  
In Table 7, we present results for all combinations of scenarios. The table headings report the scenario 
numbers, with reference to the numbering used in Table 4 and Table 5. We consider all possible results 
arising from different combinations of the three scenarios for revenues and the three scenarios for 
expenditures. 
In columns 1 and 2 we consider the case where social security benefits are apportioned according to 
stated receipt, as reported in the LFS (revenues scenario 1, expenditures scenario 2).  The net fiscal 
contribution of A8 immigrants is in this case even larger than before, with the ratio of receipts to 
expenditures for the A8 ranging from 1.37 in 2008-09 to 1.66 in 2006-07. In columns 3-4 we still keep 
revenues allocation fixed (scenario 1), but consider scenario 3 for expenditures. As explained in Table 5, 
in this case we are attributing the entire cost of management of the immigration system to the foreign 
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born population, and imputing other police costs proportionately using the share of each group in the 
prison population. Results under these criteria still suggest that A8 immigrants contribute more than 
they receive, although the ratio of revenues to expenditures is now slightly lower in every year. For 
example in 2008-09 the ratio stands at 1.34, against 1.37 in our central scenario. 
All other scenarios considered give similar results: a ratio of receipts to expenditures consistently above 
1 for A8 immigrants, and consistently below 1 for natives. The worst case scenario (from the A8 
immigrants’ point of view) is reported in the bottom right corner of Table 7. Here we again consider 
each of the scenario 3s for expenditures and for receipts, where corporation and inheritance tax 
revenues are entirely allocated to natives and council tax revenues are apportioned proportionately to 
population.  In this case the revenues/expenditures ratio for A8 immigrants in 2008-09 drops to 1.28 
while for natives it slightly increases to 0.81.  
The results show that, although different choices of apportionment methods lead to some changes in 
the revenues/expenditure ratio, A8 immigrants are unambiguously net fiscal contributors, while natives 
are unambiguously receiving more than they contribute. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This paper contributes to the debate as to whether immigration after the 2004 EU accession was 
beneficial to the UK. It is the first comprehensive analysis of the net fiscal contribution of A8 immigrants. 
Our findings suggest that A8 immigrants are highly educated; around 35% (and 17% of natives) left full 
time education at or after the age of 21, and only 11% (53% of natives) left school before the age of 17. 
Despite this, A8 immigrants receive low wages, in particular immediately after entry to the UK. However, 
every entry cohort to date has experienced a remarkable increase in wages since arrival. A8 immigrants 
are also more likely to participate in the labour market, and have higher employment rates than natives, 
on average. Again, each entry cohort increases their employment rates substantially after arrival, with 
much higher employment rates after about 4 years.  
All this paints a very positive picture of A8 immigration to the UK, one of highly educated, young people, 
entering into the UK predominantly to work with subsequent positive contributions to the tax system.  
The analysis also suggests that the labour market situation of immigrants substantially improves with 
time in the UK, in terms of both wages and labour force attachment.  
The – on average – lower wage position of the new immigrants may suggest that their fiscal net 
contribution is low, as they contribute less to the tax system than comparable natives. However our 
analysis suggests that this is, at least partly, offset by higher participation and employment rates. Above 
all, our study shows that the A8 receipt of government expenditures, in terms of benefits and other 
transfers, is substantially lower than their share of population, so that – on balance – A8 immigrants 
have made a substantial net contribution to the UK fiscal system. This net fiscal contribution remains in 
even the most conservative scenario of allocating tax receipts and expenditures. Thus, from the fiscal 
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point of view, A8 immigration has not been at all a burden on the welfare system – rather it has rather 
contributed to strengthen the fiscal position.  
But what are the longer term effects on the fiscal system? As we point out, our analysis is static and 
backward looking in nature. It relates to the years after accession in 2004. But what happens if A8 
immigrants age, have children, and may become more susceptible to illness and disability? As we discuss 
in the paper, any predictions of future contributions and receipts must rely on a set of very strong 
assumptions, and we do not wish to engage in such speculation. However, while it is true that younger 
populations receive less in benefits, it is also the case that younger immigrants, and in particular those 
who just arrived, receive lower wages. The strong wage growth of A8 immigrant arrival cohorts that we 
illustrated is likely to continue with time in the UK, so that the contributions A8 immigrants make to the 
tax system are likely to rise considerably.  In fact, if in the long run A8 immigrants receive wages relative 
to their levels of education similar to those of native born workers, then – as A8 immigrants are far 
better educated than natives in the same age cohort28 –their contributions to the tax system should 
considerably supersede those of natives. Thus, there is in our view little reason to believe that in the 
longer run, A8 immigrants who arrived between 2004 and 2008 will constitute a net burden to the 
welfare system. This is also in line with analysis we provide on the probability of welfare claims, where 
we show that A8 immigrants – even if they were identical in a large number of characteristics to natives, 
like age, education, children and disability – would still be less likely to claim benefits. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
28
 Comparing A8 immigrants and natives aged 25-35 shows that A8 immigrants are considerably more educated 
even within this cohort: 47% have a high education, and 9% a low education, which compares to 27% and 42% 
among natives. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 - A8 immigrants as a share of UK population 
 
The figure reports the share of A8 migrants in the total (solid line) and working age (dotted line) 
population for each quarter since the second quarter 2004. 
A8 migrants are defined as nationals of Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, and Poland  arrived in the UK since 2004. 
Working age: 16-65 for men, 16-60 for women. 
Source: LFS, Q2 2004- Q1 2009 
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Table 1 - A8 and UK nationals: Descriptive statistics 2004-2008 
   A8 Natives 
   M F M F 
1. Average age 26.5 25.1 37.7 39.8 
2. % age 20-35 69.8 67.3 18.6 18.0 
3. Education       
3.a % Low 11.9 10.0 58.3 53.9 
3.b % Intermediate 56.1 50.2 24.1 29.6 
3.c % High 32.0 39.9 17.6 16.5 
4 Labour market       
4.a Employment rate 90.4 74.2 78.3 71.1 
4.b Participation rate 94.9 80.4 83.0 74.6 
5 Wage     
5.a Average hourly wage 6.8 6.0 11.9 9.5 
5.b Median hourly wage 6.1 5.6 9.8 7.7 
5.c 10th hourly wage percentile 4.5 4.1 5.2 4.7 
5.d 90th hourly wage percentile 9.4 8.2 20.9 16.4 
6 Welfare     
6.a % claiming benefits or tax credits 
benefits 
12.4 23.7 24.2 55.0 
6.b % in social housing 6.5 7.7 15.9 18.3 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the A8 and native UK population by gender for years 2004 
(quarter 2) -2009 (quarter 1) pooled. 
Row 1 reports the average age, while row 2 reports the percentage of each group in the age bracket 20-
35. 
Rows 3.a-3.c report the educational distribution of each group. Education is defined based on age at 
which individuals left full time education. “Low”: left education at 16 or earlier; “Intermediate”: left 
between 17-20; “High”: left at 21 or later. 
Row 4.a reports the employment rate: defined as the ratio of individuals in employment or self 
employed to the working age population. Row 4.b reports the participation rate, defined as the ratio of 
individuals in the labour force to the working age population. 
Rows 5.a-5.d report the average real hourly wage (5.a) and the 50th(5.b), 10th (5.c) and 90th (5.d) real 
hourly wage percentile. Wages are discounted using the quarterly 2005-based CPI. 
Rows 6.a and 6.b report the percentage claiming benefits or tax credits (6.a) and the percentage in 
social housing (6.b). 
 
Source: LFS, Q2 2004- Q1 2009 
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Table 2 - A8 immigrants' wage and employment by cohort 
 
 
 
Year of arrival in the UK 
 
 
 
 
Fiscal Year 
  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Average wage 
2004  5.7 6.4 6.6 6.7 8.0 
2005   6.0 6.8 6.8 6.8 
2006    5.8 6.1 6.5 
2007     5.4 6.2 
2008      5.7 
natives  10.4 10.6 10.8 10.9 10.9 
Median wage 
2004  4.8 5.7 6.1 6.1 7.3 
2005   5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 
2006    5.3 5.7 5.9 
2007     5.2 5.8 
2008      5.5 
natives  8.4 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.8 
10th percentile 
2004  3.3 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.8 
2005   4.0 4.3 4.6 4.6 
2006    3.8 4.2 4.6 
2007     3.8 4.6 
2008      4.4 
natives  4.7 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 
90th percentile 
2004  8.1 8.3 9.2 8.8 11.0 
2005   8.4 8.6 9.5 9.6 
2006    8.3 8.2 9.0 
2007     7.1 8.0 
2008      7.8 
natives  18.2 18.6 18.8 19.1 19.1 
Employment rate 
2004  72.3 78.9 88.2 90.1 85.1 
2005   82.4 86.3 87.5 85.5 
2006    74.4 82.0 87.1 
2007     75.1 80.9 
2008      68.6 
natives  75.1 75.1 74.8 74.8 74.4 
Participation rate 
2004  84.9 84.1 92.5 94.9 89.4 
2005   89.7 89.9 90.5 89.9 
2006    85.1 86.6 90.0 
2007     85.0 84.3 
2008      78.5 
natives  78.7 78.8 79.0 78.9 79.3 
The table reports the evolution over time of the average, median, 10th percentile and 90th percentile of 
real hourly wages (discounted using 2005-based CPI) and of employment and participation rate for each 
A8 immigrants’ arrival cohort and for natives. 
LFS, Q2 2004- Q1 2009 
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Table 3 - Probability of claiming state benefits/tax credits and of living in social housing 
 Benefits/tax credits Social Housing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A8 -0.232*** -0.111*** -0.053*** -0.097*** -0.053*** -0.048*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and quarter effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gender No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Education and age 
dummies 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Dependent children No No Yes No No Yes 
N 1626253 1406533 1404792 2408729 1407267 1405528 
The table reports results from a regression of the dummy variable “receiving state benefits or tax credits” 
(cols. 1-3) and of the dummy variable “receiving state benefits or tax credits” (cols.4-6)  on three dummy 
variables for migrant status: A8 immigrants who have been in the UK for one year or more, other 
immigrants and natives (the excluded variable). Additionally all specifications include an interaction of 
year and quarter dummies. 
Education dummies include three dummy variables for different level of education: high (left full time 
education at 21 or later), intermediate (left between 17-20), low (left at 16 or earlier). Age include age 
and age squared. “Dependent children” includes a dummy variable for having no dependent children 
under the age of 19 in the household and the number of dependent children under the age of 19 in the 
household. 
 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the individual level. 
** denotes significance at 5%;  ** denotes significance at 1%;  *** denotes significance at 0.1% 
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Table 4 - Receipts allocation criteria 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Income tax and 
National 
Insurance 
Share of total payments: actual 
tax and NI rates applied to LFS 
income 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Income tax 
credits 
Share of dependent children 
population 
Approx. 75% as in 1, 
approx. 25% share of 
population 
Same as 1 
VAT and excise 
duties 
Share of total payments: 
effective rates by household 
income decile from ONS 
"Effects of taxes and benefits 
on household income" applied 
to LFS income 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Vehicle Excise 
Duties 
Share of total payments: 
effective rates by household 
income decile from ONS 
"Effects of taxes and benefits 
on household income" applied 
to LFS income 
Share of individuals 
driving to work 
Same as 1 
Corporation 
tax and Capital 
Gains tax 
Share of population, net of 
foreign owned share from  ONS 
"Share ownership" 
Same as 1 
All to natives, net of 
foreign owned share 
Inheritance tax 
Share of houseowners 
population 
Same as 1 All to natives 
Council tax Share of total households Same as 1 Share of population 
Business rates Share of self employed Share of population Same as 1 
Other Share of population Same as 1 Same as 1 
The table summarises the criteria followed to apportion tax receipts for each of the scenarios 
considered.  
Column 1 gives the apportionment followed in the central scenario. Columns 2 and 3 report the 
apportionment criteria used in alternative scenarios. 
See Table A1 (and text) for details. Where not specified, the data source is the LFS. The list of tax 
receipts is based on grouping of items in Table C6 of the 2009 Budget Report. 
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Table 5 - Expenditures allocation criteria 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
"Pure" public goods 
Share of population (average 
cost) / All to natives (marginal 
cost) 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Other publicly provided 
goods and services 
Share of population Same as 1 Same as 1 
Law courts and prisons 
Share of prison population from 
ONS "Offender Management 
Caseload Statistics" 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Housing development Share of social housing tenants Same as 1 Same as 1 
Health  
(except health research) 
Share of population in age 
group, and share of total health 
costs of age group from 
Department for Health Report 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Social protection: Social 
exclusion n.e.c. 
Share of income support or 
family benefits recipients 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Compulsory education 
Share of children in each age 
group 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Post-secondary 
education 
Share of population studying 
towards qualification 
Same as 1 Same as 1 
Immigration and 
citizenship police services 
Share of population Same as 1 
Share of immigrant 
population 
Other police services Share of population Same as 1 
Share of prison 
population from ONS 
"Offender Management 
Caseload Statistics" 
Social protection* Share of potential recipients 
Share of actual 
recipients 
Share of potential 
recipients 
The table summarises the criteria followed to apportion expenditures for each of the scenarios 
considered. Column 1 gives the apportionment followed in the central scenario. Columns 2 and 3 report 
the apportionment criteria used in alternative scenarios. See Table A2 (and text) for details. Where not 
specified, the data source is the LFS. The list of expenditures is based on grouping of items in Table 5.2 in 
PESA 2009. All three scenarios can be calculated apportioning “Pure” public goods – row 1– at their 
average cost, i.e. proportional to population, or at their marginal cost, i.e. only to natives.  
"Pure" public goods: General public services, Defence, Economic Affairs, Environment Protection (except 
waste and waste water management), street lighting, health research. Other publicly provided goods 
and services: Fire-protection services, R&D public order and safety, Public order and safety n.e.c. Waste 
and waste water management; Housing and community amenities (except housing development and 
street lighting); Recreation, culture and religion; Other education, not definable by level. 
* Except Housing, Social exclusion n.e.c., R&D Social Protection, Social Protection n.e.c. 
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Table 6 - Results: central scenario 
  
% of population Expenditures Revenues 
Revenues/ 
Expenditures 
Fiscal Year A8 Natives 
Total  
(£ million) 
% A8 
( ) 
% Natives 
( ) 
Total  
(£ million) 
%A8 
( ) 
%Natives 
( ) 
A8 Natives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
2005-06 0.25 90.47 524173 0.16 91.20 485700 0.24 86.26 1.39 0.88 
2006-07 0.52 89.88 550116 0.33 90.82 519700 0.56 85.31 1.60 0.89 
2007-08 0.87 89.24 582676 0.57 90.30 548000 0.81 84.38 1.35 0.88 
2008-09 0.91 88.80 620685 0.60 89.89 530700 0.96 83.86 1.37 0.80 
The table reports, for each fiscal year 2005-06 to 2008-09,  the percentage of A8 immigrants and of natives in the 
total UK population (columns 1,2), the total government expenditures (in million £) and the share attributed to A8 
and natives under the central scenario (columns 3,4,5), the total government revenues (in million £) and the share 
attributed to A8 and natives (columns 6,7,8), and the ratio of revenues to expenditures for A8 and natives 
(columns 9,10). 
The central scenario is described as scenario 1 in Table 4 and Table 5. 
 
Table 7 - Results: alternative scenarios 
  Revenues/Expenditures 
Revenues scenario 1 1 2 2 
Expenditures scenario 2 3 1 2 
Fiscal Year A8 Natives A8 Natives A8 Natives A8 Natives 
2005-06 1.50 0.88 1.26 0.88 1.40 0.88 1.51 0.88 
2006-07 1.66 0.89 1.50 0.89 1.61 0.89 1.68 0.89 
2007-08 1.38 0.88 1.30 0.88 1.35 0.88 1.38 0.88 
2008-09 1.37 0.80 1.34 0.80 1.36 0.80 1.36 0.80 
         
Revenues scenario 2 3 3 3 
Expenditures scenario 3 1 2 3 
Fiscal Year A8 Natives A8 Natives A8 Natives A8 Natives 
2005-06 1.27 0.88 1.33 0.88 1.44 0.89 1.21 0.89 
2006-07 1.52 0.89 1.54 0.89 1.60 0.90 1.45 0.90 
2007-08 1.30 0.88 1.29 0.89 1.32 0.89 1.24 0.89 
2008-09 1.33 0.80 1.31 0.80 1.31 0.81 1.28 0.81 
The table reports, for each fiscal year 2005-06 to 2008-09, the ratio of revenues to expenditures for A8 
and natives under several scenarios. Scenarios differ according to the method followed to apportion 
revenues and expenditures. Revenues and expenditures scenarios are numbered following Table 4 and 
Table 5 (the first two rows of the table indicate the scenario computed) where they are also described. 
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Appendix 
 
In this appendix we explain in detail the construction of the different allocation coefficients for receipts 
and expenditures –   and  –  , and in Table A1 and Table A2 we map all items of government receipts 
and expenditures to the groupings used in Table 4 and Table 5. Finally, we also report in Table A3 results 
obtained replicating the previous analysis (all scenarios) but apportioning  “pure“ public goods according 
to their marginal cost, i.e. to the resident population only. 
 
Tax receipts 
Income tax and NIC 
Income tax revenues and national insurance payments are calculated using a simple algorithm based on 
LFS variable grsswk, which is aggregated to annual salaries, including second jobs alongside the main 
occupation.  After subtracting the lump-sum personal allowance available to all individuals, we make use 
of data published by the Office for National Statistics from the General Household Survey for 2006, 
outlining the proportion of individuals with private pensions by age, sex, work pattern and income.29  
Likely pension probabilities are calculated for each income decile by working pattern and sex, and then 
applied to individual pensionable income to calculate likely pension payments for each observation. The 
rate of pension payments is set for everyone at the year-specific national average for private sector 
employees, ranging from 4% in 2004 to 4.4% in 2007, the latest year available  (source: ONS Pension 
Trends, Chapter 8, 2009 and 200530). These payments are subtracted from gross income to obtain a 
measure of taxable income, to which the appropriate rates of income tax and national insurance are 
applied to calculate approximate personal taxes paid.31  The LFS does not contain enough detail on 
individual circumstances to allow consideration of all incidental allowances.  However this is not 
believed to have a material impact on the results presented here. 
Total tax payments are summed within the sample, and  and  are then estimated as the ratio of A8 
migrants’ and UK nationals’ payments to total payments.   This ratio is applied to aggregate tax data for 
the relevant fiscal year to obtain total tax payments by each group.   
 
                                                          
29
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/GHS06/GHS06chapter6-Pensions.xls 
30
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/pensiontrends/Pension_Trends_ch08.pdf and 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/pensiontrends2005/Pension_Trends.pdf. Data are 
available for 2004, 2006, and 2007 only. Therefore we use 2004 figures for 2005, and 2007 figures for 2008. Figures 
for 2006 and 2007 are our calculations based on a weighted average of contribution  rates for members of defined 
benefit and defined contributions schemes.  
31
 For rate guidance and information on income tax and NI structure see: Income tax information, including rates 
and allowances, guidance etc http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/income_tax/index.htm  NIC rates and allowances 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/rates/nic.htm NIC guidance: www.hmrc.gov.uk/nic/background-nic.htm 
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Income tax credits 
Income tax credits are composed of Child Tax Credits (CTC) and Working Tax Credits (WTC). As in all 
years CTC constitute about 3/4 of the total (source: HMRC -Child and Working Tax Credits Statistics: 
Finalised annual awards, 2007-08, Table 1.132), we apportion in our central scenario tax credits 
according to the proportion of dependent children that are A8 or UK natives. Alternatively, in  our 
scenario 2, we calculate for every year the share of CTC in total tax credits33. We then use this share to 
calculate the amount of total tax credits to be allocated according to proportion of dependent children 
(s we do not have the figure for 2008-09, we use for this latest year the 2007 share) and we allocate the 
remainder proportionately to the A8 and natives share of population.  However, given that tax credits 
payments are about 1% of total government receipts in every year, the choice of their allocation criteria 
will not affect our final results. 
Consumption taxes – VAT and excise duties 
Consumption tax payments are computed using average effective tax rates by decile of household 
disposable income (gross annual income less income tax and national insurance receipts) from the ONS 
publication “The effect of Taxes and Benefits on Household Income”, 2005-06, 2006-07.  These are then 
applied to gross individual income. Because the latest available year is 2006-07, we use effective rates 
for this year also for fiscal years 2007-08 and 2008-09. As with income tax, these figures were totalled 
and the ratio of payments made by A8 migrants and natives to total payments are calculated for VAT 
and other consumption taxes ( )34. This procedure implicitly assumes that immigrants and 
natives with the same income have the same behaviour. Alternatively, we try to relax this assumption 
using the proportion of individuals driving to work – thought to be a proxy of car ownership – from the 
LFS to allocate vehicle excise duties ( . 
Corporation tax and capital gains tax 
Corporation taxes and capital gains tax ( ) are apportioned using methodology from 
(Sriskandarajah, Cooley, & Reed, 2005), which subtracts the percentage likely to be paid by foreign 
shareholders, before apportioning the remainder using the percentage of A8 migrants and natives in the 
sample.  We obtain information on the share of foreign shareholders from the ONS 2006 “Share 
Ownership” report.  This gives the annual share of foreign ownership in UK companies between 1999 
and 2006, with the exception of 2005. We therefore use the 2004 figure for 2005, and similarly we use 
the 2006 share for all subsequent years. 
Alternatively, we relax the implicit assumption that A8 immigrants and natives generate the same 
amount of corporation tax per head by apportioning revenues entirely to natives (
).   
                                                          
32
 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal-tax-credits/ctcw-tax-credit-final-may09.pdf  
33
 72% in 2007-08, 73% in 2006-07, 75% in 2005-06.  
34
 For petroleum revenue tax and fuel duties we have used effective tax rate for duty on hydrocarbon oils 
), similarly for wine and spirit we have the same rate  . 
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Inheritance tax 
In apportioning inheritance tax we use house ownership as a proxy for asset ownership (financial, land 
and buildings).  We calculate from the LFS the percentage of house owners (using the variables ten96 
and ten1) and use it for   and . However, given that A8 immigrants are much younger than 
natives, we also consider a scenario where all inheritance tax revenue is apportioned to natives 
( ). 
Council tax 
Council tax payments are apportioned proportionately to the share of A8 and native households ( ), 
or alternatively proportionately to population shares. 
Business rates 
Business rates are a tax on non-domestic property, typically paid by businesses and other organisations 
which occupy non-domestic premises. We use the proportion of A8 and natives in the self-employed 
population from the LFS as the best proxy, to construct . Alternatively, we also simply apportion 
business rates proportionately to population. 
Other tax payments 
All remaining tax payments are apportioned according to the population shares (
. These are the three “environmental” taxes, contributing annually to less 
than 0.4% of total revenue: landfill tax - levied on waste that is disposed of at landfills; climate change 
levy - charged on business consumers of taxable commodities for lighting, heating and power; 
aggregates levy - a tax on sand, gravel and rock that is dug from the ground or dredged from the sea. 
The remaining receipt categories are “Other taxes and royalties”, “Adjustments”, “Interest and 
dividends”, “Other receipts”, and the negative item “Own resources contribution to EC budget,” which 
do not have any other natural apportioning criterion. 
 
Expenditures 
Pure public goods 
Costs for pure public goods (in the terminology of PESA 2009, used also in Table A” – General public 
services, defence, economic affairs, pollution abatement, protection of  biodiversity and landscape, R&D 
environment protection, environment protection n.e.c, street lighting, health research) are attributed to 
A8 and natives according to their share in the population, which is equivalent to charging the average 
cost of provision to both groups  ( ). In Table A3  we also 
report results for all scenarios in the case where expenditures for public goods are charged at their 
marginal costs. Then we assume that the costs for public goods are only borne by the part of the 
population that was already in the UK before the 2004 EU enlargement (i.e. natives and earlier 
migrants). Results in this case clearly strengthen the findings of our analysis as they improve A8 
immigrants’ net fiscal contribution, while worsening that of natives. 
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Other public goods and services 
Not all public services are effectively non-rival, and therefore the increase in population may also 
increase the cost of providing them. For this reason, we apportion the costs for those public goods that 
are –at least to some extent – rival in consumption, proportionally to population (
). These are: fire-protection services; R&D public order and safety; public 
order and safety n.e.c; waste management; water management; community development; water 
supply; R&D housing and community amenities; housing and community amenities n.e.c.; recreation, 
culture and religion; education not definable by level; subsidiary services to education; R&D education; 
education n.e.c.; R&D social protection; social protection n.e.c. 
For simplicity, we have also included in this category EU transactions, accounting adjustments, and 
unallocated ( )which – although not public goods – we have always apportioned 
proportionately to population shares. 
Law courts and prisons 
Expenditures for law courts and prisons ( ) is allocated to A8 and natives proportionately to their 
share in the total prison population. Information regarding the nationality of prison inmates is taken 
from the 2005, 2006 and 2007 Offender Management Caseload Statistics, and from the June 2008 
Population in Custody statistics, both Ministry of Justice Statics Bullettin35. It is worth stressing that this 
measure provides an over-estimate of the share of A8 immigrants in the prison population, 
predominantly because we are not able to separately identify individuals from A8 countries arrived 
before and after the EU enlargement of May 2004. We use the proportion of prison population to 
apportion expenditures for law courts as well because no data are available about number of trials or 
litigations by nationality. 
Housing development 
Housing development ( ) is apportioned according to population share living in social housing 
calculated from the LFS, based on the variables llord, land96, ten1, ten96 
Medical and other health services 
We apportion medical costs by age for both A8 and native individuals. We use information from the 
Department for Health Departmental Report 2006 (figure 6.2) outlining the share of health costs by age 
band in 2004. These are the most recent available data; therefore we use these figures to apportion 
expenditures in all years, assuming that the distribution of health costs by age did not vary over the 
years we analyse. Formally, coefficients are constructed as:  where i indexes the 
                                                          
35 Available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/omcsq405tab3.xls (2005); 
www.justice.gov.uk/publications/offender-management-caseload-stats-2006.htm (2006); 
www.justice.gov.uk/publications/prisonandprobation.htm (2007); 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/populationincustody-2008.htm (2008). 
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eight age bands, hi is the share of total health costs of age band i, and  is the share of individuals of 
group G (G=A8, natives) in age band i.  
Education 
We apportion expenditure in compulsory education using LFS information on the national composition 
of population in the relevant age group for each school grade. For pre-primary education,  is the 
share of A8 and migrants in the population aged 0 to 4; for primary education,  is the share in 
population aged 5 to 10; for secondary education,  is the share in population between 11 and 15. 
Expenditure in post-secondary education ( ) is apportioned using LFS self-reported information 
about further education contained in the variable qulhi4.  
This approach does not take into account the proportion of children enrolled in fee-paying schools.  
Over the period we consider, 7% of school age pupils in England attended a fee-paying school (source: 
DCSF: The Composition of Schools in England, June 2008, p.10), and it is likely that these children are 
disproportionately drawn from the UK national subpopulation.  We have therefore also experimented 
an alternative apportioning method, where 7% of education costs are apportioned to foreigners only. 
This does not affect our results. 
Police services 
Police expenses relative to immigration and citizenship are arguably a public service, and therefore we 
apportion their cost proportionately to population in our central scenario ( ). 
However, it could be argued that these costs should be entirely attributable to immigrants. Although 
this is disputable where expenses for immigration controls are for the primary benefit of natives (see the 
discussion in Sriskandarajah, Cooley, & Reed (2005)) we have also tried to apportion immigration and 
citizenship costs proportionately to the share in the foreign population. This means that , and 
 is equal in every year to the share of A8 immigrants in the total immigrant population.  
Other police services are also apportioned proportionately to population in our central scenario 
. However, one may fear that immigration may increase crime and hence raise 
police costs. For this reason we also checked our results using the share of A8 and natives in prison 
population as a proxy of crime activity (see apportionment of prison costs for details) in the construction 
of   and .  
 
Social protection 
In our central scenario we generally apportion expenditures on elements of social protection according 
to potential recipients (the exception is Social Security n.e.c.). This is because the LFS variable outlining 
actual receipt of specific type of benefits (tpben31) is often unreliable when we break down the data 
according to very fine country of birth groups, leaving us with few observations for A8. However, we 
also check the robustness of our results using LFS information on actual benefit recipients, and it turns 
out to make little difference. Unfortunately we have no information as to the value of the benefits 
received,  only on the number of recipients. 
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We apportion sickness and disability proportionately ( ) according to the composition of those who 
declare disability in the LFS, based on the variable discurr. Alternatively, we also use the population of 
self-declared disability benefit recipients resulting from the LFS. Old age and survivors shares (
) are constructed based on the proportion of A8 and natives in the inactive pension age population 
(women over 60, men over 65), or in the population of pension recipients. Social protection for family 
and children ( ) is apportioned proportionately to the share of A8 and natives among dependent 
children (we define as dependent children anyone who is inactive and under the age of 18), or among 
the recipients of income support or family related benefits recipients. Expenditure on social protection 
for unemployment ( ) is apportioned according to the composition of the unemployed population, or 
according to the composition of unemployment benefits recipients. Housing expenditure ( ) is 
apportioned proportionately to the composition of the population in social housing or to the 
composition of housing or council tax benefits recipients. 
Finally, we have apportioned other expenditures on protection of social exclusion ( ) according to the 
share of A8 and natives among the recipients of income support or family-related benefits recipients, as 
they make up in every year more than 84% of the total expenditure in this category, and there was no 
obvious population of potential recipients to use as an alternative apportionment method. 
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Table A1 – List of government receipts and grouping 
i Revenue source Grouping in table 4 
1 Income tax revenue 
Income tax and National Insurance 
2 NICs payments 
3 Income tax credits Income tax credits 
4 Tax credits adjustment 
5 VAT 
VAT and consumption taxes 
6 Petroleum revenue 
7 Fuel duties 
8 Stamp duties 
9 Tobacco duties 
10 Spirits duties 
11 Wine duties 
12 Beer and cider duties 
13 Betting and gambling duties 
14 Air passenger duty 
15 Customs duties and levies 
16 Insurance premium tax 
17 Vehicle Excise Duties Vehicle Excise Duties 
18 Corporation tax 
Corporation tax and Capital Gains tax 
19 Corporation tax credits 
20 Capital Gains Tax 
21 PC corporation tax payments 
22 Inheritance tax Inheritance tax 
23 Council Tax Council Tax 
24 Business rates Business rates 
25 Landfill tax 
Other 
26 Climate change levy 
27 Aggregates levy 
28 Other taxes and royalties 
29 Adjustments 
30 Interests and dividends 
31 Other receipts 
32 Own resources contribution to EC 
budget 
The table reports the list of receipts from Table C6 of the 2009 Budget Report (second column), 
together with the indexing used in the paper (first column) and the category in which they have 
been grouped in Table 4 (third column). 
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Table A2 – List of government receipts and grouping 
j Expenditure 
Grouping in 
table 5 
j Expenditure 
Grouping in 
table 5 
1 1. General public services 
"Pure" public 
goods 
25 10.9 Social protection n.e.c. 
Other public 
goods 
2 2. Defence 26 EU Transactions 
3 4. Economic affairs 27 Unallocated 
4 5.3 Pollution abatement 28 Accounting adjustements 
5 
5.4 Protection of biodiversity and 
landscape 
29 3.3 Law courts 
Law courts and 
Prisons 
6 5.5 R&D environment protection 30 3.4 Prisons 
7 5.6 Environment protection n.e.c 31 6.1 Housing development 
Housing 
development 
8 6.4 Street lighting 32 Medical services Health (except 
health 
research) 9 7.2 Health research 33 
Central and other health 
services 
10 3.2 Fire-protection services 
Other publicly 
provided goods 
and services 
34 10.7 Social exclusion n.e.c  
Social 
Protection: 
Social 
exclusion  
11 3.5 R&D public order and safety 35 
 9.1 Pre-primary education: 
under fives Compulsory 
education 12 3.6 Public order and safety n.e.c. 36  9.1 Primary education 
13 5.1 Waste management 37 9.2 Secondary education 
14 5.2 Waste water management 38 
9.3 Post-secondary non-
tertiary education 
Post-secondary 
education 
15 6.2 Community development 39 9.4 Tertiary education 
16 6.3 Water supply 40 
3.1 Police services: 
Immigration and citizenship 
Imm.and 
citizenship 
police services 
17 
6.5 R&D housing and community 
amenities 
41 3.1 Other police services 
Other police 
services 
18 
6.6 Housing and community 
amenities n.e.c 
42 10.1 Sickness and disability  
Social 
protection 
19 8. Recreation, culture and religion 43 10.2 Old age  
20 9.5 Education not definable by level 44 10.3 Survivors  
21 9.6 Subsidiary services to education 45 10.4  Family and children 
22 9.7 R&D education 46 10.5 Unemployment 
23 9.8 Education n.e.c  47 10.6 SP: Housing 
24 10.8 R&D social protection     
The table reports the list of expenditures  from Table 5.2 in PESA 2009 (columns 2 and 5), together with the 
indexing used in the paper (columns 1 and 3) and the category in which they have been grouped in Table 5 
(columns 3 and 6 ).  
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Table A3 – Results when public goods are apportioned to pre-2004 residents only 
  Revenues/Expenditures 
Revenues scenario 1 1 1 
Expenditures scenario 1 2 3 
Fiscal Year A8 Natives A8 Natives A8 Natives 
2005-06 2.31 0.90 2.65 0.91 1.85 0.88 
2006-07 2.67 0.91 2.85 0.92 2.25 0.89 
2007-08 2.18 0.90 2.25 0.90 1.92 0.88 
2008-09 2.21 0.82 2.21 0.82 1.99 0.80 
Revenues scenario 2 2 2 
Expenditures scenario 1 2 3 
Fiscal Year A8 Natives A8 Natives A8 Natives 
2005-06 2.33 0.90 2.67 0.91 1.86 0.88 
2006-07 2.69 0.91 2.88 0.92 2.27 0.89 
2007-08 2.19 0.90 2.26 0.90 1.93 0.88 
2008-09 2.20 0.82 2.20 0.82 1.98 0.80 
Revenues scenario 3 3 3 
Expenditures scenario 1 2 3 
Fiscal Year A8 Natives A8 Natives A8 Natives 
2005-06 2.21 0.91 2.53 0.91 1.77 0.88 
2006-07 2.57 0.92 2.75 0.92 2.17 0.89 
2007-08 2.08 0.91 2.15 0.91 1.84 0.88 
2008-09 2.12 0.82 2.12 0.83 1.91 0.80 
The table reports, for each fiscal year 2005-06 to 2008-09, the ratio of revenues to expenditures for 
A8 and natives under several scenario, when we apportion public goods according to their marginal 
cost, i.e. allocating their costs only to pre-2004 residents.. Scenarios differ according to the method 
followed to apportion revenues and expenditures. Revenues and expenditures scenarios are 
numbered following Table 4 and Table 5, and the first two rows of the table indicate the scenario 
reported. 
 
 
